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I. INTRODUCTION
Aviation has achieved an unprecedented level of safety for any
mode of transportation. It is also one of the most heavily regu-
lated industries in the world. In the United States, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for regulating the
aviation industry, including the design of aviation products, to
promote safety. When accidents occur, they frequently result in
litigation and may include defective design claims against avia-
tion product manufacturers. The 2016 decision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Sikkelee v. Precision Air-
motive Corp.1 underscores a fundamental challenge for practi-
tioners and courts in aviation design defect cases: the FAA
aircraft certification process is highly technical and complex,
and significantly misunderstood by litigants and the courts. This
has led to a misapplication of the federal preemption defense
and a pressing need for better guidance on this issue, which is
important to both the safety and the viability of aviation.
Sikkelee arose from a fatal crash of a Cessna 172, a single-en-
gine piston, four-seat airplane often used in personal flying and
flight training.2 Over 43,000 172s have been produced—more
than any other aircraft.3 The specific aircraft at issue in Sikkelee
was powered by an engine manufactured in 1969, which had
been installed in the aircraft in 1998 and overhauled in 2004.4
In 2005, the aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff, killing one of
the two pilots on board.5 The deceased pilot’s wife sued seven-
teen defendants in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, includ-
ing the engine manufacturer, alleging, inter alia, that the
aircraft’s engine was defectively designed.6 Applying Third Cir-
1 822 F.3d 680 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 495 (2016).
2 Id. at 685. General aviation encompasses all civilian flying—except for sched-
uled commercial passenger transport—including business travel, medical trans-
port, aerial firefighting, law enforcement, flight training, search and rescue, and
more.
3 Robert Goyer, Cessna 172: Still Relevant, FLYING (Jan. 19, 2012), https://www.
flyingmag.com/aircraft/pistons/cessna-172-still-relevant [https://perma.cc/
HT85-GVPR].
4 Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 685.
5 Id.
6 Id. The plaintiff specifically alleged a defect in the engine’s carburetor,
which blends air and fuel for the engine. Id.
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cuit precedent that the Federal Aviation Act preempts the “field
of aviation safety,”7 the district court granted summary judg-
ment for the engine manufacturer, finding that federal law
preempts state standards in aviation design defect cases and that
FAA certification indicated compliance with that federal
standard.8
On appeal, however, the Third Circuit took a different view,
struggling to identify a federal standard of care applicable to the
alleged engine design defect.9 That difficulty, combined with
what the Third Circuit characterized as “three fundamental dif-
ferences” between regulations governing in-flight operations
and aircraft design regulations, led the court to distinguish de-
sign standards from the preempted field of aviation safety and
decline to recognize federal field preemption for design defect
claims.10 On remand, the district court found the claims conflict
preempted because of the manufacturer’s inability to comply
with both state and federal law, further exposing the errors of
the Third Circuit’s holding.11
This article explains how Sikkelee marks a significant misunder-
standing of federal aviation product certification and identifies
the preemptive federal standard applicable in such cases. Sec-
tion II describes the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme
governing aviation product design and manufacture. Section III
provides a brief overview of preemption in aviation product lia-
bility cases. Section IV demonstrates how the congressionally-
mandated regulatory system for aviation product design and
manufacture requires recognition of a federal standard. Section V
explains the applicable federal standard and how courts and
practitioners should apply that standard, and Section VI
concludes.
7 Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999).
8 Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 686. The district court specifically found that the FAA’s
issuance of a type certificate indicated compliance with the federal standard. Id.
9 Id. at 694–95; see infra Section III. The U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania found that a federal standard of care was appropriate for
product liability claims but also acknowledged that the “highly technical and
part-specific nature” of FAA aircraft certification regulations made it “exceed-
ingly difficult to translate into a standard of care that could be applied to a tort
claim.” Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 694–95.
10 Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 694.
11 Sikkelee v. AVCO Corp., No. 4:07-CV-00886, 2017 WL 3317545, at *2 (M.D.
Pa. Aug. 3, 2017) (“[T]he FAA’s regulations are highly particularized, govern
nearly every aspect of the regulated field, and are born from the twin aims of
ensuring the safety of consumers and protecting the public.”).
746 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
II. EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL CONTROL: THE REGULATION
OF AVIATION PRODUCTS AND COMPONENT PARTS
Few industries are as heavily regulated by the federal govern-
ment as aviation.12 Today, the FAA is the federal agency respon-
sible for the advancement, safety, and regulation of civil aviation
in the United States.13 Congress created the predecessor to the
FAA, the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in 1938, recognizing
the importance of uniform regulation in fostering the develop-
ment of air commerce and aviation industry.14 As the aviation
industry and government regulation thereof grew, Congress en-
acted the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to consolidate regulatory
authority into a single body, the FAA,15 and directed the FAA to
promulgate safety standards, including for design and manufac-
ture of aviation products.16 The FAA fulfilled its regulatory man-
date by creating a comprehensive system that encompasses the
entire aviation realm, from the development, use, and mainte-
nance of aviation products, to the persons in aviation operations
(from dispatchers to mechanics to pilots to air traffic control-
lers) and the airspace in which they operate.
A. STANDARDS FOR DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING
Congress specifically tasked the FAA with approving initial avi-
ation product designs and subsequent design changes and mon-
itoring products in service for potential safety hazards.17
Accordingly, FAA regulations require federal certification of
product design (type certificate), manufacturing (production
certificate), and aircraft airworthiness (airworthiness certifi-
12 H.R. REP. NO. 103-525, pt. 2, at 6 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1644, 1647 (recognizing that aviation products are regulated “to a degree not
comparable to any other” industry).
13 49 U.S.C. §§ 106(g), 40104(a) (2012).
14 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, § 601, 52 Stat. 973, 1007–08. The Air Com-
merce Act was passed in 1926, tasking the Secretary of Commerce with issuing
rules for air traffic, licensing pilots, certifying aircraft, and operating and main-
taining navigation aids. Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, § 3, 44 Stat. 568,
569–70. The Aeronautics Branch, later renamed the Bureau of Air Commerce,
initially was tasked with primary authority for aviation oversight. A Brief History of
the FAA, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2017, 4:42 PM), https://www.faa.gov/
about/history/brief_history/ [https://perma.cc/CUK6-CVH9].
15 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 301(a), 72 Stat. 731, 744.
16 Id. §§ 601(a), 603. The Federal Aviation Agency was later reorganized under
the Department of Transportation and renamed the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration. Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat.
931 (codified in 49 U.S.C. § 106 (2016)).
17 Id. §§ 603(a), 609.
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cate), as well as govern post-certification maintenance, design
modifications, and continued operational safety (continued air-
worthiness).18 The primary purpose of these extensive design
and manufacturing regulations is to make aircraft safe for in-air
operations.19
The FAA approves the design of an aviation product and is-
sues a type certificate if a manufacturer satisfies the product’s
certification basis and the FAA finds that the product is in a con-
dition for safe operation.20 The FAA establishes the certification
basis for each type of certification project based on the “design
features of the product to be type certificated.”21 The certifica-
tion basis designates all of the applicable federal regulations and
special conditions for safety that must be met to achieve type
certification;22 it essentially defines the safety standard to which
a product is built and maintained.
The FAA sets the certification basis for a product after the
applicant submits a formal application to the agency, which in-
cludes information about the proposed product’s design, mate-
rial, specifications, construction, and performance.23 But the
FAA’s involvement in the design process often begins before an
application is submitted and the certification basis is set. Gener-
ally, the first step in any certification project is for the FAA to
conduct orientation and familiarization briefings with the type
certificate applicant to, among other things, ensure that the
FAA understands the proposed product.24
18 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 21–43 (2016).
19 See, e.g., id. § 21.1(b)(1) (“Airworthiness approval means a document, issued
by the FAA for an aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or article, which certifies
that the aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or article conforms to its approved
design and is in a condition for safe operation” (emphasis added)).
20 Id. § 21.21.
21 Type Certification, FAA Order No. 8110.4C, 30–31 (Mar. 28, 2007) [herein-
after FAA Order 8110.4C] (“The certification basis is established by the FAA and
agreed to by the applicant, based on a mutual understanding of the design fea-
tures of the product to be certificated.”).
22 See 14 C.F.R. § 21.16 (“If the FAA finds that the airworthiness regulations . . .
do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for an aircraft, aircraft
engine, or propeller because of a novel or unusual design feature of the aircraft,
aircraft engine or propeller, he prescribes special conditions and amendments
thereto for the product.”); Id. § 21.17.
23 See Application for Type Certificate, Production Certificate, or Supplemen-
tal Type Certificate, FAA Form 8110-12 (2014). In the case of an aircraft engine,
the applicant must describe the engine design features, operating characteristics,
and operating limitations. 14 C.F.R. § 21.15(c).
24 FAA Order 8110.4C, supra note 21, at 20.
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After the application is submitted and the FAA sets the certifi-
cation basis, the applicant submits a detailed certification plan
to the FAA for approval.25 The certification plan explains how
the applicant will meet each requirement in the certification ba-
sis.26 After the FAA approves the certification plan, the applicant
implements it, conducts extensive engineering and flight tests
and analyses, and generates reports to demonstrate compliance
with all applicable requirements—a process which takes multi-
ple years.27
After the applicant generates, substantiates, and documents
compliance data, the FAA reviews the data and decides whether
to issue a type certificate, making an independent finding of
compliance for each requirement in the certification basis.28 Fi-
nally, the applicant and the FAA establish a record of the certifi-
cation process and compliance with applicable regulations and
the foundation for continued airworthiness activities through-
out the product’s life.29
The FAA also requires manufacturers to obtain an FAA pro-
duction certificate to assure the agency that the manufacturer
can duplicate a type certificated design.30 To obtain a produc-
tion certificate, an applicant must establish, among other things,
a quality system to “ensure[ ] that each product and article con-
forms to its approved design and is in a condition for safe opera-
tion.”31 Before issuing a production certificate, the FAA
conducts a quality system audit to evaluate whether the appli-
cant’s quality system, organization, and facilities meet FAA
requirements.32
25 Id. at 21.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 41–57.
28 14 C.F.R. § 21.21(b) (stating that an applicant is entitled to a type certificate
if he submits “the type design, test reports, and computations necessary to show
that the product to be certificated meets the applicable airworthiness, aircraft
noise, fuel venting, and exhaust emission requirements of this subchapter and
any special conditions prescribed by the FAA,” and the FAA finds that the prod-
uct meets all applicable requirements); see also id. §§ 23, 25, 27, 29, 33–36 (pre-
scribing substantive design and performance standards for various aviation
products).
29 See FAA Order 8110.4C, supra note 21, at 57–63.
30 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.131–21.150.
31 Id. § 21.137. Production certificate applicants (and holders) must allow the
FAA to inspect their operations. Id. at § 21.140.
32 Id. § 21.141. Once a production certificate is issued, FAA Manufacturing In-
spection District Offices (MIDOs) provide continued oversight to ensure that
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In addition to certifying the design and manufacture of avia-
tion products, the FAA also certifies the airworthiness of each
aircraft.33 The FAA only issues an airworthiness certificate if the
agency determines that the specific aircraft conforms to its FAA-
approved type design and is in a “condition for safe opera-
tion.”34 To make this determination, an FAA aviation safety in-
spector (or authorized representative) conducts a detailed
inspection of the aircraft and its records to ensure that equip-
ment is properly installed, that it conforms to its approved type
certificate, and that it operates properly.35
In sum, the FAA sets the safety standards for an aircraft with
the certification basis, certifies that the design meets the certifi-
cation basis, and certifies that both the method by which the
aircraft is produced and the specific aircraft itself comply with
the certification basis.
B. STANDARDS FOR SAFETY DURING OPERATION
After the FAA certifies a specific aircraft and it begins operat-
ing, the FAA controls the continued operational safety (COS) of
that aircraft for its entire service life. The purpose of the COS
requirements is to ensure the aircraft continues to satisfy the
original certification basis standard and control the standards to
which any product design change is made. The FAA accom-
plishes COS in primarily three ways. First, any person who wants
to perform maintenance or an alteration on an FAA-approved
aircraft must be properly trained and certificated by the FAA.36
The FAA controls the standards for the certification of mechan-
ics and the manner in which the maintenance or alteration is
performed.37
Second, after the FAA issues a type certificate, a manufacturer
cannot deviate from that approved design without further FAA
approval.38 The FAA requires any person seeking to modify an
production certificate holders maintain compliance with FAA regulations. See id.
§ 21.140.
33 Id. §§ 21.183, 91.203. The FAA prohibits anyone from operating a civil air-
craft in the United States without a valid airworthiness certificate. Id. § 91.203(a).
34 Id. § 21.183; Airworthiness Certification of Products and Articles, FAA Order
No. 8130.2H, 2-10–2-15 (Feb. 4, 2015) [hereinafter FAA Order 8130.2H].
35 See FAA Order 8130.2H, supra note 34, at 2-15.
36 14 C.F.R. § 65.81. The FAA permits certificated pilots to perform specified
preventative maintenance on aircraft they own or operate in certain situations,
such as repairing landing gear tires. Id. § 43.3(g), pt. 43 app. A.
37 See id. §§ 43.1–43.17, 65.71–65.107.
38 Id. §§ 21.91–21.101.
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FAA-approved design—in a way that would appreciably affect
the weight, balance, structural strength, reliability, operational
characteristics, or other characteristics affecting the product’s
airworthiness—to obtain a supplemental type certificate
(STC).39 With an STC, the FAA approves not only a modifica-
tion to an approved design, but also how that modification af-
fects the original design, which is incorporated by reference. To
obtain approval for complex design modifications, an applicant
must follow the original design approval process, including satis-
fying a certification basis standard set by the FAA specifically for
that design modification.40
Third, the federal regulatory framework provides the FAA
with the responsibility and authority for changing an FAA-ap-
proved design to correct a safety issue. To carry out this obliga-
tion, the FAA has mechanisms to continually evaluate the safety
of in-service, certified aviation products. The FAA monitors
these products throughout their service lives utilizing the Moni-
tor Safety/Analyze Data (MSAD) process. To facilitate FAA
monitoring, type certificate holders are obligated to report
product failures, malfunctions, and defects to the FAA.41 The
FAA also collects data on in-service, certified products through
its involvement in the investigation of aircraft accidents, a re-
sponsibility exclusively within federal control.42 During the
MSAD process, the FAA tracks and assesses this in-service fleet
39 Id. Even minor changes to type certificated designs that do not appreciably
affect airworthiness require FAA approval. Id. § 21.93(a) (“A ‘minor change’ is
one that has no appreciable effect on the weight, balance, structural strength,
reliability, operational characteristics, or other characteristics affecting the air-
worthiness of the product.”); id. § 21.95. Any design change that has any appreci-
able effect on airworthiness requires an approval process similar to the type
certification process. Id. § 21.97; Applicant’s Showing of Compliance and Certify-
ing Statement of Compliance, Advisory Circular No. 21-51, Fed. Aviation Admin,
at 1–2 (Sept. 28, 2011).
40 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.111–21.120.
41 Id. § 21.3.
42 Unlike motor vehicle accidents, which are investigated by state and local
authorities, Congress created an independent federal agency, the National Trans-
portation Safety Board (NTSB), and gave the NTSB sole authority over aviation
accident investigations. 49 U.S.C. § 1131 (2012); see also 49 C.F.R. § 800.3(a)(1)
(2016) (requiring the NTSB to investigate every civil aviation accident in the
United States); id. § 831.2(a). The NTSB has complete discretion over who par-
ticipates in an aircraft accident investigation, except for the FAA (and the Coast
Guard), which is, by law, automatically designated a participant “when participa-
tion is necessary to carry out the duties and powers of the Secretary [of Transpor-
tation]”—that is, a safe and efficient aviation system. 49 U.S.C. § 1132(c); 49
C.F.R. § 831.11(a).
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data on aviation products, evaluates the risk posed by each iden-
tified hazard, and determines corrective actions to mitigate
safety issues.43 In selecting a corrective action, the FAA is re-
quired to evaluate effectiveness, costs, timeliness of implementa-
tion, and complexity.44
If the FAA becomes aware of an unsafe condition through in-
spections, reports, accident data, or any other manner, and it
determines that the condition is likely to exist or develop in
other products of the same design, the FAA issues an “airworthi-
ness directive” to correct the unsafe condition for in-service air-
craft.45 Airworthiness directives are “legally enforceable rules”
subject to notice and comment by industry stakeholders, includ-
ing manufacturers and aircraft owners and operators.46 Owners
and operators must comply with airworthiness directives for
their aircraft to be considered airworthy and operate legally in
the United States.47
If the FAA finds that correcting the unsafe condition requires
a design change for future aircraft produced under the type cer-
tificate, the type certificate holder still must submit appropriate
design changes to the FAA for review and approval.48 These design
changes will necessitate a modification to the product’s original
certification basis and require the type certificate holder to
demonstrate compliance with such standard.49 The FAA may
also at any time re-inspect a product and amend, modify, sus-
pend, or revoke any part of a certificate if it decides that the
action is required in the interest of air safety.50
43 Monitor Safety/Analyze Data, FAA Order No. 8110.017A, 1, 8 (Oct. 1,
2012). MSAD is “designed to promote . . . data-driven, risk-based” continued op-
erational safety decision-making to support aviation products throughout their
life cycles. See generally id. at i. Through this process, the FAA conducts a risk
analysis, which requires an FAA engineer to “objectively characterize[ ] hazards
for probabilities and severity, and determine[ ] the risk posed by each hazard
associated with a given safety issue.” Id. at 8. This risk analysis is followed by a
causal analysis and the evaluation and selection of a corrective action.
44 Id. at 21.
45 14 C.F.R. § 39.5.
46 Id. § 39.3; FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR NO. 39-7D: AIRWORTHI-
NESS DIRECTIVES 1–2 (2012).
47 14 C.F.R. §§ 39.7, 39.9. To ensure compliance, the FAA is empowered to
investigate and penalize regulatory violations, including issuing civil penalties,
seizing aircraft, and taking actions against FAA certificates. See id. §§ 13.1–13.401.
48 Id. § 21.99.
49 Id. §§ 21.99, 21.113, 21.115.
50 See 49 U.S.C. § 44709; 14 C.F.R. § 21.181.
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In short, the FAA’s exclusive control over continued opera-
tional safety of certified aviation products ensures that products
meet the safety standards of original certification basis through-
out their service lives and allows the FAA to establish the stan-
dards to which any product is modified.
III. PRODUCT LIABILITY PREEMPTION LITIGATION:
A BRIEF OVERVIEW
In aviation product liability cases, the FAA has consistently
stated that “[t]he structure of the Federal Aviation Act confirms
the federal government’s occupation of the field of substantive
safety standards by establishing an all-encompassing federal reg-
ulatory framework and directing the Secretary to issue regula-
tions setting safety standards for every facet of air safety and
aircraft design.”51 Until the Third Circuit’s decision in Sikkelee,
courts appeared increasingly receptive to the defense of federal
preemption in aviation design defect cases.
Initially, in Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the Federal Aviation Act
does not preempt state design defect claims against an aircraft
manufacturer.52 Seven years later, however, the Tenth Circuit
51 Letter Brief of Amicus Curiae for the Dep’t. of Transp. and Fed. Aviation
Admin. at 7, Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680 (3d Cir. 2016)
(No. 14-4193), 2015 WL 5665724. The FAA also advanced this position in an
amicus brief filed in Cleveland stating, “As an initial matter, the very nature of the
regulated field—the prescription of safety standards for aircraft moving in or af-
fecting interstate commerce—is so inherently federal in character that state law
must give way or risk interfering with the discharge of a uniquely federal func-
tion. A plane’s utility arises out of its ability to traverse great distances at great
speeds. That utility would be seriously impaired if a plane were subject to differ-
ent and potentially conflicting standards whenever it crossed a state boundary.”
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1993) (No. 91-2065), 1992 U.S. 10th Cir. Briefs
LEXIS 1.
52 Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1442 (10th Cir. 1993)
(“Congress did not intend to occupy the field of airplane safety to the exclusion
of the state common law.”). The facts of Cleveland are as follows: The pilot plain-
tiff modified the tandem seat of a tail wheel aircraft by removing the front pilot’s
seat. Id. at 1441. The owner of the airport from which the pilot plaintiff intended
to fly closed the airport out of concern for the safety of the pilot plaintiff’s opera-
tion and parked his van on the runway to prevent the pilot plaintiff from taking
off. Id. The pilot plaintiff was seriously injured when he attempted to takeoff and
struck the van. Id. His estate sued the aircraft manufacturer, and the jury deter-
mined that the manufacturer had negligently designed the aircraft without ade-
quate visibility from the rear seat and without providing a rear shoulder harness.
Id.
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revisited the question in US Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell and con-
cluded, contrary to its earlier decision, that “the comprehensive
regulatory scheme promulgated pursuant to the FAA evidences
the intent for federal law to occupy the field of aviation safety
exclusively.”53 In doing so, the court cited several circuit court
cases following the Third Circuit’s influential holding in the
1993 case Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc.54
Abdullah involved allegations of negligence on the part of a
commercial airline flight crew for failing to take reasonable pre-
cautions to avoid turbulence and failing to give passengers ade-
quate warnings about the turbulence.55 The Third Circuit held
that “the FAA and relevant federal regulations establish com-
plete and thorough safety standards for interstate and interna-
tional air transportation . . . that . . . are not subject to
supplementation by, or variation among, jurisdictions.”56 Signifi-
cantly, the court stated that “[i]t follows from the evident intent
of Congress that there be federal supervision of air safety and
from the decisions in which courts have found federal preemp-
tion of discrete, safety-related matters, that federal law preempts
the general field of aviation safety.”57 The Third Circuit cited, inter
alia, the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal Inc., in which the Court recognized Congress con-
solidating control of aviation in the FAA as indicative of intent
to federally preempt the field of aviation safety.58
Subsequently, the Third Circuit reaffirmed and clarified its
position in Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., recognizing that the
Federal Aviation Act “directs the FAA to issue regulations in
keeping with two safety-related goals . . . such as by prescribing
standards for the construction and maintenance of aircraft
. . . .”59 The court further explained, “most of the regulations
adopted pursuant to the Aviation Act concern aspects of safety
that are associated with flight. For example, the regulations de-
53 US Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1327 (10th Cir. 2010).
54 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999).
55 Id. at 365.
56 Id. (“[W]e hold that federal law establishes the applicable standards of care
in the field of air safety, generally, thus preempting the entire field from state
and territorial regulation.”). Id. at 367.
57 Id. at 371 (emphasis added).
58 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638–40 (1973)
(concerning airspace management and its relationship with noise regulation).
59 Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 128 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing
49 U.S.C. § 44701(c), (a)).
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tail certification and ‘airworthiness’ requirements for aircraft
parts.”60
Following Abdullah, three federal circuit courts—in addition
to the Tenth—issued decisions citing Abdullah and suggesting a
favorable impression of preemption for aviation product design
standards. In Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the Fifth Circuit an-
swered the preemption question more narrowly than the Third
Circuit, but cited airworthiness standards among regulations is-
sued by the FAA “[p]ursuant to its congressional charge to regu-
late air safety.”61 In Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Systems, Inc.,
the Sixth Circuit expressly agreed with the Third Circuit’s rea-
soning in Abdullah “that federal law establishes the standards of
care in the field of aviation safety and thus preempts the field
from state regulation.”62 And in Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, the
Ninth Circuit cited airworthiness standards among regulations
established with “a preemptive intent to displace all state law on
the subject of air safety.”63
With Sikkelee, the Third Circuit abrogated Abdullah, limiting
the preempted field of aviation safety to “in-air operations,”
which the court determined does not include aircraft design
standards.64 In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit pur-
ported to identify “three fundamental differences between the
regulations at issue in Abdullah and those concerning aircraft
design,” stating that the latter: (1) do not contain a general stan-
dard of care; (2) are not as comprehensive; and (3) lack a provi-
60 Id.
61 Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir. 2004); see also id. at
385 (citing Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999)).
62 Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., 409 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 2005).
63 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 472 (9th Cir. 2007); see also id. at
473 (reviewing Abdullah, 181 F.3d 363). In Estate of Becker v. AVCO Corp., the Su-
preme Court of Washington found that the Ninth Circuit narrowed its holding in
Montalvo when it ruled preemption did not bar the product liability suit of a
woman who fell down a flight of airstairs. Estate of Becker v. AVCO Corp., 387
P.3d 1066, 1070–71 (Wash. 2017). The Ninth Circuit held that the FAA had not
“comprehensively regulated” airstairs, and, therefore, did not intend to preempt
state law. Martin v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir.
2009). The claim and decision parallels the Third Circuit’s holding in Elassaad.
Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 128. Whereas aircraft disembarkation may not be related to
in-flight safety and thus not necessarily the subject of comprehensive FAA regula-
tion, aircraft design and manufacture are inherent to in-air safety and are regu-
lated as such. Id.
64 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 689, 694–95 (3d Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 495 (2016).
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sion analogous to 14 C.F.R. § 91.13, a regulation prohibiting
careless or reckless piloting.65
Despite the court’s assertion that Sikkelee is consistent with
prior precedent, the decision is difficult to square with Abdullah
and Elassaad, let alone the Federal Aviation Act and the FAA’s
regulations. The primary purpose of aircraft design and manu-
facturing regulations is to make aircraft safe for in-air operations;
how can they be excluded from preemption?66 How can the reg-
ulations requiring a pilot to determine the airworthiness of an
aircraft—cited in Sikkelee—relate to the preemptive field of in-
flight safety, but the regulations specifying substantive design
standards for airworthiness do not?67 Further, the court distin-
guished “regulations governing in-flight operations”—which the
court explained as prescribing “rules governing the operation of
aircraft”—from design and manufacturing regulations, which
the court stated merely establish “procedures for manufacturers
to obtain certain approvals and certificates from the FAA.”68
This distinction ignores the fact that the regulations explicitly
contain “[r]ules governing applicants for, and holders of, any ap-
proval or certificate.”69 Contrary to the court’s finding, the de-
sign and manufacturing regulations clearly contain not only
procedural requirements, but also substantive standards for the
design, manufacture, and performance of certified products.
Despite the inconsistencies in the decision, the Supreme
Court of Washington reversed a lower court decision that found
65 Id. at 694–95; 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2016) provides:
(a) Aircraft operations for the purpose of air navigation. No person
may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to
endanger the life or property of another.
(b) Aircraft operations other than for the purpose of air naviga-
tion. No person may operate an aircraft, other than for the purpose
of air navigation, on any part of the surface of an airport used by
aircraft for air commerce (including areas used by those aircraft for
receiving or discharging persons or cargo), in a careless or reckless
manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.
66 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 21.1(b)(1) (“Airworthiness approval means a document,
issued by the FAA for an aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or article, which cer-
tifies that the aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or article conforms to its ap-
proved design and is in a condition for safe operation.” (emphasis added)).
67 The Third Circuit specifically identifies a pre-flight duty among the preemp-
tive regulations, which requires a pilot to determine an aircraft is airworthy prior
to flight. Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 694. Accordingly, the court could not have intended
the preempted field to be limited solely to regulations governing aircraft in
flight.
68 Id.
69 14 C.F.R. § 21.1(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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preemption in a similar case, Estate of Becker v. AVCO Corp., and
adopted the Third Circuit’s reasoning and conclusion.70 It is un-
clear whether other circuits will also follow the Third Circuit’s
lead. To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to weigh in.
In November 2016, the Court rejected a petition for certiorari in
Sikkelee, which was supported by trade associations representing
both manufacturers and pilots.71 In August 2017, however, the
district court issued an opinion in Sikkelee on remand and held
that the state tort claims are conflict preempted.72 The district
court’s detailed explanation of the volume and application of
governing FAA regulations undermines the Third Circuit’s con-
clusions. The court explained:
[B]ecause our Court of Appeals has held that the FAA regula-
tions do not field preempt related state tort claims, Plaintiff sug-
gests that there must be some universe of claims that survives
conflict preemption as well—that conflict preemption cannot ef-
fectively accomplish in one particular case what field preemption
would have done in all cases. I am not so uneasy about the oppo-
site proposition. Nothing in PLIVA and Bartlett suggests that field
preemption and conflict preemption cannot be coextensive or
that conflict preemption may only apply to a lesser universe of
claims than field preemption otherwise might have.73
Although the district court’s conflict preemption finding was
correct, the rationale used could have equally supported a find-
ing of field preemption.74
IV. A FEDERAL STANDARD OF CARE IS NECESSARY
Aviation is, by its very nature, a uniquely federal industry; the
very purpose of aircraft is to transcend state boundaries. As Con-
gress recognized, the interstate nature of aviation necessitates
uniform regulation across states. The FAA’s certification process
provides the uniformity and predictability necessary for the
transportation infrastructure of the United States. It has also
proven highly successful: the U.S. aviation industry is the safest,
largest, most diverse, and most technologically innovative in the
70 Estate of Becker v. AVCO Corp., 387 P.3d 1066, 1071–72 (Wash. 2017).
71 Both General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) and Aircraft
Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) filed amicus briefs.
72 Sikkelee v. AVCO Corp., No. 4:07-CV-00886, 2017 WL 3317545, at *36 (M.D.
Pa. Aug. 3, 2017).
73 Id. at *43 n.25.
74 Id. at *25 (quoting PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241, 253 (3d
Cir. 2014) (finding field preemption)).
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world. According to NTSB accident data, 2015 had the lowest
number of fatal general aviation accidents and the fewest fatali-
ties on record in the United States.75
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal
law impliedly preempts state law or regulation when “the perva-
siveness of the federal regulation precludes supplementation by
the States, [or] where the federal interest in the field is suffi-
ciently dominant.”76 The FAA’s regulatory framework requires
federal field preemption to achieve Congress’s safety goals; it
cannot coexist with supplementation by or variation among lo-
cal safety standards.77 Conflict preemption only can resolve state
standards in conflict with federal requirements, not different
safety standards across states.78 There is no dispute that com-
mon law product liability actions impose state-law duties on de-
fendant manufacturers, amounting to affirmative regulation
thereof.79 States have a wide variety of different tests for deter-
mining design defects, which conflict preemption will not har-
monize. Without uniform, exclusive federal control,
manufacturers could be subject to varying design directives in
different states. If a manufacturer does not modify a design in
accordance with a state product liability decision, the manufac-
turer risks further liability in that state. And because manufac-
turers have little to no control over where their products go
after they are sold, manufacturers are potentially exposed to lia-
bility in all U.S. jurisdictions, which could mean fifty different
state design standards.
Aircraft transcend not only state, but international borders.
Internationally, FAA regulations are considered the gold stan-
dard; foreign aviation authorities have long looked to FAA regu-
lations when establishing their rules. The FAA also has
longstanding bilateral agreements with foreign civil aviation au-
thorities recognizing reciprocal airworthiness certification of
75 Press Release, Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., NTSB 2015 Aviation Statistics Show
General Aviation Accidents Continue to Decline (Sept. 22, 2016), https://
www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/PR20150922.aspx [https://perma.cc/
8JU5-GLBZ].
76 Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988); U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2.
77 Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 300.
78 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
79 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 522 (1992) (State common-
law damages actions operate to require manufacturers to comply with common-
law duties.); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 328–29 (2008) (“General
tort duties of care . . . ‘directly regulate’ the device itself, including its design.”).
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products to achieve regulatory harmonization in the interest of
safety and innovation.80 Variable state standards could impede
the ability of the United States to comply with these agreements,
or the willingness of foreign authorities to enter into them.
State standards not only jeopardize the viability of the aviation
industry, but also may compromise, rather than enhance, safety
overall. As described in detail above, the FAA enforces its design
standards through a highly technical and complex certification
process overseen and administered by expert engineers.81 The
fundamental aspect of any aviation design defect action is a ret-
rospective analysis of an FAA-approved design after an accident.
State standards developed through litigation allow the FAA’s
comprehensive system for approving and maintaining the safety
of certificated products to be second-guessed by expert wit-
nesses, judges, and jurors on a case-by-case basis through the
narrow prism of tort law. The jury, instead of the FAA, is effec-
tively asked to become the determinant of aviation safety and to
make that safety determination based on how one specific acci-
dent might have been prevented. In contrast to the jury’s nar-
row perspective, the FAA makes holistic safety assessments
through its type certification and continuing airworthiness activ-
ities, processes that allow for stakeholder input and consider the
broader economic and safety effects on aviation to leverage the
expertise not only of the agency, but also the industry.82
Further, the FAA’s control over product design is so pervasive
that changing an approved design to comply with state-law du-
ties will require the FAA’s permission.83 Even if the FAA did not
require approval for a state-required change, a manufacturer
would still be in the impossible position of having to satisfy con-
flicting state-law duties. In short, Congress tasked the FAA with
determining whether a design is safe and when and how an un-
safe condition must be eliminated, and the imposition of state
law standards stands in opposition to the FAA’s responsibility
and execution thereof.
Congress clearly tasked the FAA with regulating the design
and safety of aviation products. Both the courts in Sikkelee and
Becker emphasized that in establishing the FAA’s authority to
80 Fed. Aviation Admin., Bilateral Agreements Overview (May 2, 2008), https:/
/www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/international/bilateral_agreements/overview/
[https://perma.cc/52MF-7GFL].
81 See generally 14 C.F.R. pt. 23; FAA Order 8110.4C, supra note 21.
82 See generally 14 C.F.R. pt. 23; id. § 11.5; FAA Order 8110.4C, supra note 21.
83 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.91–21.101.
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regulate aviation products, Congress instructed the FAA to issue
the minimum standards required in the interest of safety, evinc-
ing an intent for the FAA’s regulations to be minimum safety stan-
dards that states can supplement with additional requirements.84
This, however, overlooks key qualifying phrases in the statute—
”minimum standards required in the interest of safety” and
“necessary for safety”—that is, minimum standards required in
the interest of safety and minimum standards necessary for
safety.85 The Federal Aviation Act gives the FAA “plenary author-
ity” to “[m]ake and enforce safety regulations governing the de-
sign and operation of civil aircraft” in order to ensure the
“maximum possible safety and efficiency.”86
In the Federal Aviation Act, Congress expressly directed the
FAA to issue whatever standards may be necessary to “promote
safety of flight of civil aircraft in air commerce”87—but not to
issue more than what is required for safety. The text and the legisla-
tive history make clear that Congress’s intent was to strike a bal-
ance between regulation necessary for safety and facilitating
growth of the industry. The word “minimum” was intended to
limit unduly burdensome regulation, not to accommodate sup-
plemental state regulation. There is no indication that the fed-
eral standards are “minimums” in relation to state laws, or that
the federal regulations do not establish an acceptable level of
safety. Congress’s intent requires exclusive federal control to
achieve a safe and efficient aviation system.
V. UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING THE FEDERAL
STANDARD OF CARE
A. THE CERTIFICATION BASIS ESTABLISHES THE FEDERAL DESIGN
SAFETY STANDARD
The Sikkelee and Becker decisions exemplify how courts struggle
to identify the federal safety standards for aircraft manufacture
and design, and thus misapply the federal preemption defense
because they do not understand how aviation product design is
84 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a) (2012); Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d
680, 694 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 495 (2016); Estate of Becker v.
AVCO Corp., 387 P.3d 1066, 1070 (Wash. 2017); see also Federal Aviation Act of
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 601(a), 72 Stat. 731, 775.
85 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a).
86 H.R. REP. NO. 85-2360, at 2, 7 (1958), as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741,
3741–42, 3747.
87 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 601(a)(1), 72 Stat. 731,
775; see also 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a).
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governed. This is likely due to the complex and highly technical
nature of FAA design and manufacturing regulations, and con-
cern over not providing plaintiffs a mechanism to recover after
accidents. In Sikkelee, the court concluded that the “highly tech-
nical and part-specific nature” of the FAA’s aircraft design regu-
lations made them “exceedingly difficult to translate into a
standard of care that could be applied to a tort claim.”88 The
court emphasized that it could not identify a regulation that
“sounds in common law tort.”89
The Third Circuit is correct in concluding that there is not
one common tort-like regulation that sets the design safety stan-
dard for an aviation product. The FAA’s design safety standard
for a product is actually the certification basis, which consists of
(1) all the applicable airworthiness regulations (e.g., materials;
workmanship; construction; testing; structural characteristics;
flight performance; systems and equipment; operating proce-
dures and limitations; markings and placards; and flight and
maintenance manuals); and (2) any necessary “special condi-
tions” prescribed by FAA through rulemaking.90 The FAA issues
special conditions if the agency finds that the existing airworthi-
ness regulations “do not contain adequate or appropriate safety
standards . . . because of a novel or unusual design feature of
the aircraft.”91 Special conditions address capabilities and char-
acteristics of a product not yet addressed by existing FAA regula-
tions and establish a level of safety equivalent to that established
by the regulations such that “no feature or characteristic makes
[the product] unsafe” for the certification requested.92
As the district court in Sikkelee recognized, “[a] type certificate
confirms that the aircraft or its component is properly de-
signed.”93 To obtain a type certificate, an applicant must demon-
strate to the FAA compliance with the certification basis.94 For
each airworthiness standard, the FAA outlines or agrees to ex-
tensively detailed technical requirements on how the applicant
88 Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 695; see also Estate of Becker, 87 387 P.3d at 1070.
89 Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 695.
90 14 C.F.R. § 21.17(a); see, e.g. id. pt. 23.
91 14 C.F.R. § 21.16.
92 Id. § 21.21(b)(2).
93 Sikkelee v. AVCO Corp., No. 4:07-CV-00886, 2017 WL 3317545, at *3 (M.D.
Pa. Aug. 3, 2017).
94 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.17(a), 21.20.
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will demonstrate compliance (e.g., design, testing).95 The FAA
must find
[u]pon examination of the type design, and after completing all
tests and inspections, that the type design and the product meet
. . . the applicable airworthiness requirements . . . or that any
airworthiness provisions not complied with are compensated for
by factors that provide an equivalent level of safety; and . . . [f]or
an aircraft, that no feature or characteristic makes it unsafe for
the category in which certification is requested.96
Each type certificate holder is issued a “type certificate data
sheet” (TCDS), which contains a “certification basis” section de-
fining the applicable regulations, amendments, special condi-
tions, and other requirements that the holder must satisfy to
obtain the type certificate.97
An example can more clearly illustrate how the certification
basis establishes the federal safety standard for product design.
The Cirrus Vision SF50 aircraft is a single-engine, very light jet
aircraft which recently received a type certificate from the FAA
in 2016.98 The certification basis for the SF50 is comprised of
regulations from 14 C.F.R. part 23, which consists of airworthi-
ness standards for aircraft weighing less than 12,500 pounds,
and four special conditions.99 One Part 23 standard, § 23.1306,
required the manufacturer, Cirrus Aircraft, Inc. (Cirrus), to
demonstrate to the FAA that each of the SF50’s electrical and
electronic systems were designed and installed such that the sys-
tem’s function was “not adversely affected during and after the
time the airplane is exposed to lightning,” and can “automati-
cally recover[ ] normal operation of that function in a timely
95 Id. § 21.20(a). Although new FAA rules are moving away from specific, pre-
scriptive requirements for certain products and toward more performance-based
standards, the certification basis still establishes the level of performance that
must be achieved, and the means of compliance must still be acceptable to the
FAA. Revision of Airworthiness Standards for Normal, Utility, Acrobatic, and
Commuter Category Airplanes, 81 Fed. Reg. 96,572, 96,574 (Dec. 30, 2016)
(“The standards will maintain or increase the level of safety associated with the
current part 23, while also facilitating the adoption of new and innovative tech-
nology in general aviation (GA) airplanes.”). The FAA still sets the safety
standard.
96 14 C.F.R. § 21.21.
97 FAA Order 8110.4C, supra note 21, at 75.
98 See Fed. Aviation Admin., Type Certificate Data Sheet No. A00018CH (Rev.
3) (Aug. 21, 2017), http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rg
MakeModel.nsf/MainFrame?OpenFrameset [https://perma.cc/Z5RH-AQXA].
99 Id.
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manner.”100 The method of how Cirrus demonstrates (e.g., de-
sign, testing) to the FAA that the SF50 meets the requirements
of § 23.1306 must either be established or agreed to by the
FAA.101 This critical part of the process—the intricate means of
demonstrating compliance—is an additional layer through
which the FAA establishes design safety, although generally not
discussed by courts. That is, the FAA type certification process is
so comprehensive that the agency not only makes a determina-
tion about whether safety objectives are met, but first makes a
determination about whether the means for demonstrating
compliance with safety objectives are appropriate.
The SF50 example also provides an opportunity to better un-
derstand special conditions. One of the four special conditions
in the SF50 certification basis related to the aircraft’s proposed
“whole airplane parachute recovery system.”102 Finding that it
constituted a “novel or unusual design feature,” the FAA pub-
lished a notice of proposed special conditions for the parachute
system that “contain[ed] the additional safety standards that the
Administrator consider[ed] necessary to establish a level of
safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness
standards.”103 After reviewing public comments, the FAA later
finalized a range of requirements that Cirrus had to satisfy in
order to obtain a type certificate.104 In issuing a type certificate,
the FAA confirmed that the SF50 aircraft met the federal safety
design standard, or certification basis, and no feature or charac-
teristic made it unsafe.
100 14 C.F.R. § 23.1306(a). Further examples of design standards in Part 23
applicable to the SF50 airplane include § 23.143(a) (requiring that the “airplane
must be safely controllable and maneuverable during all flight phases”) and
§ 23.603 (specifying the “suitability and durability of materials used for parts” and
mandating that “[w]orkmanship must be of a high standard”).
101 Aircraft Electrical and Electronic System Lightning Projection, Advisory
Circular No. 20-136B, Fed. Aviation Admin., (Sept. 7, 2011). Although a regula-
tory change has modified the lightning protection standard, the fundamental
process of having the FAA outline or approve the means of complying with the
standard remains in effect.
102 Special Conditions: Cirrus Design Corporation, Model SF50; Whole Air-
plane Parachute Recovery System, 81 Fed. Reg. 14,801, 14,801 (Mar. 18, 2016).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 14,803; Special Conditions: Cirrus Design Corporation, Model SF50;
Whole Airplane Parachute Recovery System, 81 Fed. Reg. 45,965, 45,967–68 (July
15, 2016) (final special conditions).
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B. WHY THE CERTIFICATION BASIS ESTABLISHES A FEDERAL
DESIGN SAFETY STANDARD
Understanding that the certification basis establishes the fed-
eral standard of care provides manufacturers and plaintiffs with
clarity and predictability as to their tort law duties and claims,
while not obviating manufacturer liability for product designs.
First, the certification basis places the focus of litigation on the
product design standard established by the FAA, fulfilling Con-
gress’s interest in ensuring the FAA’s central, uniform, and ex-
clusive control of aviation safety. This provides manufacturers
and pilots with consistent and reliable aircraft design stan-
dards—benefits of which are passed along to the consumers in
the form of lower product costs. It also provides clarity on when
plaintiffs may be justly compensated in aviation product liability
cases. Importantly, the certification basis design standard is
promulgated through the rulemaking process, which requires
the FAA to consider input from all interested stakeholders, in-
cluding manufacturers, pilots, aircraft owners, and other mem-
bers of the public, before issuing a final rule.105 In this way, the
certification basis is created with stakeholder input, providing a
legal design duty that leverages broad expertise and balances
diverse interests.
Second, the certification basis encompasses the broad concept of
design safety. In Sikkelee, the Third Circuit concluded that the
FAA’s aviation product design regulations were not “compre-
hensive” and preemptive because they did not contain a catch-
all “standard of care” that “could be used to evaluate conduct
not specifically prescribed by the regulations.”106 Citing Abdul-
lah, the Third Circuit relied on and referenced 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.13, which prohibits any person from operating “an aircraft
in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or
property of another.”107
The Third Circuit described § 91.13 as “the overall concept
that aircraft may not be operated in a careless or reckless man-
ner.”108 In so holding, the Third Circuit seems to have imposed
a new prerequisite for finding preemption; specifically, that the
regulatory scheme must contain an explicit tort-like standard,
105 14 C.F.R. §§ 11.5, 21.16.
106 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 695 (3d Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 495 (2016).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 689.
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or, in the absence of a specific regulation, a general description
of the safety standard. Field preemption, however, is not pre-
mised on any particular regulation or specific phraseology, but
rather congressional intent to occupy the field.109 Although the
procedures and standards for certifying aviation products do not
contain one specific regulation that prohibits a manufacturer
from designing an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner, the
comprehensive regulatory framework for aviation product certi-
fication prohibits designing and manufacturing in a careless or
reckless manner. The regulations require manufacturers to
demonstrate and certify compliance with specific requirements
that establish safe product design.110 Even the Third Circuit rec-
ognized that a type certificate “arguably reflects nationwide stan-
dards for the manufacture and design of . . . parts.”111
Third, the certification basis establishes a comprehensive
safety standard for the entire certified product. The type design ap-
proved by the FAA includes specifications of the aircraft and
each of its component parts.112 Although a specific aspect of that
type design may not be expressly mentioned in a regulation,
that does not mean it is outside the scope of the certification
basis.113 For example, 14 C.F.R. part 23 outlines standards for an
aircraft’s fuel system, such as “[e]ach fuel system must be con-
structed and arranged to ensure fuel flow at a rate and pressure
established for proper engine and auxiliary power unit function-
ing under each likely operating condition.”114 The FAA has cho-
sen to regulate certain aspects of the individual components of
fuel systems by establishing certain performance standards for
the functionality of the fuel system overall. The FAA’s decision
to not issue regulations or impose additional “special condi-
tions” on any particular aspect of the fuel system, other than the
fuel system’s safety and reliability as a whole, is a deliberate deci-
sion from the federal government. A decision from the FAA to
not require testing or detailed analysis on a specific component
109 Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015) (“Congress may
have intended ‘to foreclose any state regulation in the area,’ irrespective of
whether state law is consistent or inconsistent with ‘federal standards.’”).
110 14 C.F.R. § 21.21 (2016).
111 Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 694.
112 14 C.F.R. § 21.31.
113 See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 694–95 (“Rather, many are in the nature of discrete,
technical specifications that range from simply requiring that a given component
part work properly . . . to prescribing particular specifications for certain aspects
(and not even all aspects) of that component part.”).
114 14 C.F.R. § 23.951.
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or design feature does not mean that a state jury may impose its
own standards for that component or design feature. And any
effort from state law to fill an FAA-intended void through the
imposition of common law duties would frustrate and obstruct
the objectives of both Congress and the FAA.115
C. HOW COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE CERTIFICATION BASIS IN
PRACTICE
Despite federal control over the initial design of aviation
products and changes to that design, product liability claims
often focus on potential alternative designs for the aviation
product.116 To understand how applying the certification basis
as the federal standard of care works in practice, it is illustrative
to understand what happens in a case when a court does not
apply the federal standard of care.
Depending on the applicable state tort framework, plaintiffs
may bring design defect claims against an aviation product man-
ufacturer under negligence or strict liability theories. For negli-
gence claims, a jury typically considers expert testimony as to the
applicable standard of care for the product’s design and as to
whether the manufacturer breached that standard.117 Under a
strict liability theory, most American jurisdictions apply the risk-
utility standard for determining the existence of a design defect
for an aviation product:118 A defective condition exists “if a ‘rea-
sonable person’ would conclude that the probability and seri-
ousness of harm caused by the product outweigh the burden or
costs of taking precautions.”119
Under either framework, the product must be defective to
sustain a claim for liability, thereby incorporating a concept of
duty.120 Any design involves compromise—decisions that were
weighed and tested through the certification process. Given the
115 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000) (find-
ing preemption where state law stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”).
116 See, e.g., Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 389 (Pa. 2014).
117 See, e.g., Salerno v. Innovative Surveillance Tech., Inc., 932 N.E.2d 101, 112
(Ill. 2010) (“Because products liability actions involve specialized knowledge or
expertise outside of a layman’s knowledge, the plaintiff must provide expert testi-
mony on the standard of care and a deviation from that standard to establish
either of these propositions.”).
118 See, e.g., Tincher, 104 A.3d at 389.
119 See, e.g., id.
120 Sikkelee v. AVCO Corp., No. 4:07-CV-00886, 2017 WL3317545, at *37 (M.D.
Pa. Aug. 3, 2017).
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complexity of aviation products and the fact that litigation tends
to focus on one small aspect of the product, there are virtually
unlimited claims which may be raised by a plaintiff and his or
her experts about alternate designs that would redress an al-
leged defect and purportedly make the product “safer” under
the circumstances. The expert’s review is not constrained by the
FAA’s airworthiness standards and involves a narrow concept of
safety based primarily on the specific accident. There is no way
to know that an expert’s hypothetical alternative design would
even achieve FAA certification, or would be safer overall in
practice.
But when a jury verdict is rendered, the finding effectively
means that, contrary to the FAA’s determination, in the applica-
ble state, the product design is not safe for operation. The court
effectively supplants the role of the FAA and approves an alter-
nate design outside the aviation product certification process. If
a jury imposes liability, the manufacturer must comply with the
resultant duty of care by modifying the design, which might not
be technically feasible or consistent with FAA airworthiness stan-
dards, or risk future liability.121 The FAA’s approval, however, is
required for any modification to design, and such approval is
not routinely granted.122 If the manufacturer chooses not to
comply with the state-determined duty of care and change its
design, or cannot by virtue of the FAA’s refusal to approve the
design change, then the manufacturer remains at risk. This pro-
cess not only creates costly disputes between plaintiff and de-
fense expert witnesses over the applicable standard of care to
apply for design defect claims, but also creates significant uncer-
tainty for manufacturers over the standards by which they are
measured.
Recognizing the certification basis as a manufacturer’s legal
design duty eliminates many of these problems by integrating
aircraft design complexity and the FAA’s highly technical certifi-
cation process into state tort liability frameworks. Applying the
certification basis as the federal standard of care eliminates the
argument that a manufacturer should have done something dif-
ferent from what the FAA considered and required for the prod-
uct to be deemed safe. It prevents a retrospective redesign of the
121 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 522 (1992); Riegel v. Med-
tronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 328–30 (2008).
122 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.93(a), 21.95, 21.97(a), 21.101, 21.113; FAA Order 8110.4C,
supra note 21, at 87.
2017] APPLYING A FEDERAL STANDARD OF CARE 767
product through the proposal of hypothetical and ambiguous
alternative designs.
The certification basis does not displace a state tort frame-
work with framework, rather, it provides the federal design
safety standard for that framework.123 Thus, it applies regardless
of whether a claim is common law negligence or strict liability.
Under a negligence framework, a plaintiff must demonstrate the
manufacturer is at fault for the defect.124 In strict liability, dam-
ages may be imposed without a demonstration of fault; the man-
ufacturer is liable if the product has a defect causally linked to
the injury.125 The certification basis is the federal standard of
care in negligence actions and the standard by which the fact
finder determines the existence of a defect in strict liability
cases.
Accordingly, a plaintiff could still bring design defect claims
under theories of negligence and strict liability. In response to a
plaintiff’s complaint, a manufacturer’s product type certificate
and TCDS would constitute prima facie evidence that no product
defect exists because the FAA only issues a type certificate after
the agency determines that the certification basis has been met.
The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the man-
ufacturer failed to comply with the product’s certification basis,
thus focusing on whether the product met the FAA’s design
safety standard, rather than expert witness testimony about alter-
nate designs not governed by the applicable certification basis.
Design claims, and the concept of safety grounding them, are
based on legislative principles and regulatory standards, rather
than inconsistent and unpredictable standards.
Importantly, the certification basis approach preserves a num-
ber of methods for holding a manufacturer accountable. The
Third Circuit seemed particularly bothered with type certifica-
123 Utilizing the federal safety design standard is equally consistent with the
General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA) of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108
Stat 1552 (codified as 49 U.S.C. § 40101). GARA is a statute of repose which bars
civil actions against a manufacturer after eighteen years but does not address the
standard of care in aviation product liability actions in any form. See id. Nor was
GARA intended to impact federal regulation of air safety. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO.
103-525(II), at 3 (1994) (stating that GARA was to establish a “time limitation[ ]
on certain civil actions against aircraft manufacturers”).
124 Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 864 N.E.2d 249, 263 (Ill. 2007) (“The key
distinction between a negligence claim and a strict liability claim lies in the con-
cept of fault.”).
125 See, e.g., Hinckley v. La Mesa R.V. Center, Inc., 158 Cal. App. 3d 630, 642–44
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
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tion preempting a state claim, expressing concern that this
would result in “the mere issuance of a type certificate ex-
empt[ing] designers and manufacturers of defective airplanes
from the bulk of liability for both individual and large-scale air
catastrophes.”126 Plaintiffs have also criticized the preemption
defense on grounds that much of the certification work is per-
formed by manufacturers through the organization designation
authorization (ODA).127 Although ODAs may have more strin-
gent standards than the FAA, with a certification basis standard,
a plaintiff would be permitted to present evidence of the manu-
facturer’s design not satisfying the applicable certification basis,
notwithstanding the presentation of a type certificate and
TCDS.128 Moreover, plaintiffs also retain the right to raise manu-
facturing defect and failure to warn claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
Understanding and properly applying the federal preemption
defense in aviation product liability actions has never been more
essential. In less than 120 years, aviation has grown from the
Wright brothers’ first-powered flight to over 87,000 flights per
day in the United States. In 2014 alone, civil aviation accounted
for $1.6 trillion in total economic activity in the United States.129
The industry continues to face new challenges, from supersonic
flight to commercial space transport to unmanned aerial sys-
tems. The FAA is tasked with the advancement, safety, and regu-
lation of civil aviation in the United States. The agency’s role in
regulating the safety of aircraft continues to grow as the entire
industry continues to expand and diversify into other means of
air travel outside of traditional, fixed-wing aircraft. That means
the potential applications of the preemption defense in the avia-
tion product context equally expands.
Courts and practitioners must understand the FAA’s compre-
hensive aircraft certification process to ensure they can properly
126 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 696 (3d Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 495 (2016).
127 Id. at 708; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-14, AVIATION
SAFETY: CERTIFICATION AND APPROVAL PROCESSES ARE GENERALLY VIEWED AS WORK-
ING WELL, BUT BETTER EVALUATIVE INFORMATION NEEDED TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY
20 (2010).
128 Air Traffic, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://sos.noaa.gov/
datasets/air-traffic/ [https://perma.cc/459W-SUFJ].
129 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CIVIL AVIATION ON THE
U.S. ECONOMY 5 (2016).
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identify and apply the product’s certification basis as the pre-
emptive federal standard applicable in aviation product liability
actions. Utilization of the certification basis design standard will
provide manufacturers and pilots with more reliable and consis-
tent aircraft design standards, allow the public and other stake-
holders to provide input on the acceptable level of safety for
aviation products, and balance the interests arising after an avia-
tion product causes injury. And most importantly, the certifica-
tion basis standard fulfills Congress’s intent in ensuring the
FAA’s exclusive and uniform control over aviation safety,
thereby enabling the FAA to continue advancing the aviation
industry long into the future.
